Multilateral Environmental Agreements And The Compliance Continuum

38. None of the major environmental disasters of recent years, such as the Amoco Cadiz oil spill in 1978 or the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1985, have resulted in international legal proceedings: see p.B., Birnie, P. and Boyle, A., International Law and the Environment (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1992) p. 137. Very few cases before the ICJ concerned environmental issues, including: case concerning the Gabcikovo Nagymaros project (Hungary/Slovakia), 25 September 1997, ICJ Rep. (1997); Case concerning certain phosphate countries in Nauru, Preliminary Objections, 26 June 1992, ICJ Rep. (1992) p. 240Google Scholar et seq; Case concerning the delimitation of the maritime border in the Gulf of Maine, October 12, 1984, ICJ Rep. (1984) p.

245Google Scholar et seq; Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Rep. (1996) p. 225Google Scholar et seq. In summary, my conclusions (1) must respond appropriately to global environmental problems and reinforce the commitments made by the parties to the Economic Partnership and Economic Development ACCORD. (2) Strict enforcement mechanisms are needed to ensure compliance with these obligations; and (3) The effectiveness of any enforcement mechanism is determined by its legitimacy, since illegality has emerged as one of the main reasons against the application of enforced enforcement in international law. 122. Churchill and Ulfstein criticize the indicative measures of the Montreal Protocol as unnecessarily restrictive by requiring that the suspension of rights and their prerogatives be consistent with existing treaty legislation and not with the „appropriate appropriate right of international institutions“: a. a. 5, p. 645. In pp. 643-647, they briefly address the application of international institutional law to violations of essential obligations arising from multilateral environmental agreements and to the interpretation and application of KNPs (an issue that goes beyond the scope of this article), although they conclude that, in the absence of practice, the issue remains rather theoretical beyond the NCP of the Montreal Protocol.

33. For example, non-compliance with reporting obligations is explicitly addressed under the Montreal Protocol, which will be discussed later. 94. Like Boyle, Op. n. 92, notes that Iraq`s responsibility for environmental damage during its invasion and occupation of Kuwait, recognized by Security Council Resolution 687, is one of the few examples of the State`s exclusive responsibility for environmental damage, albeit with requests made through an international forum, the United Nations Compensation Commission. The Wimbledon Affair, (1923) PCIJ Ser. A, No. 1 is an interesting example of bilateral and multilateral remedial measures sought as part of an erga omnes partes commitment: France demanded on its own reparation for the losses suffered, while the other three States sought to define the disputed principle and thus put an end to the illegal action.

It is cited in the ILC`s third report, paragraph 114, 206, as an example of whether other states „should be able to seek compensation or counter them on their own behalf.“ 5. A number of other recent agreements have or are considering non-compliance procedures. The 1989 Basel Convention on cross-border transfers of hazardous waste and disposal, as well as the 1980 Convention on wildlife and wildlife conservation in the Antarctic Sea, examples include: see again Redgwell, C., „Protection of Ecosystems under International Law: Lessons from Antarctica,“ in Boyle, A. and Freestone, D., eds., International Law and Sustainable Development (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999) Ch. 9Google. Non-compliance procedures are also defined in the recent Aarhus Regional Convention on Public Participation in 1998 (Article 15), the 1998 Rotterdam Convention on the Informed Prior Consent Procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international trade (art.